ABSTRACT: This Essay addresses a longstanding concern in
The Essay offers the first comprehensive examination of this phenomenon and its many negative consequences, highlighting the need for more exacting judicial scrutiny of intergovernmental investigations. Without such scrutiny, modern silver platter doctrine, which allows admission of evidence illegally secured by non-forum agents found to be acting independently of agents of the forum court, is permitted to reign supreme. The Essay thus picks up where mid-twentieth-century courts left off, providing a reinvigorated framework to smoke out forum government agent involvement in investigations and condemn the legal evasion that it allows. In doing so, the Essay shines a spotlight on a critically important matter implicating core rule-of-law and governmental transparency values, which will assume evergreater importance in coming years as governments accelerate their combined investigative efforts in the battle
American federalism has long complicated efforts to regulate police investigative practices. The difficulty stems from the fact that when governments act on their individual sovereign power to impose legal limits on police authority, they do more than instantiate Madison's goal of affording citizens a "double security." 1 They also create the risk that officers, collectively engaged in the "competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime," 2 will seek to evade a more demanding legal norm of one government. 3 The Supreme Court first recognized this risk in the Prohibition Era, when it condemned efforts by the federal government, whose agents were alone subject to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, 4 to mount prosecutions based on liquor illegally seized by state agents. In 1927, a unanimous Court proclaimed that the judiciary "must be vigilant to scrutinize the attendant facts with an eye to detect and a hand to prevent . . .
[illegalities] by circuitous and indirect methods." 5 The federal exclusionary rule should apply when a "search in substance and effect was a joint operation of the local and federal officers." 6 In another Prohibition case, decided that same term, the Court again unanimously condemned a state search resulting in a federal liquor prosecution, noting that "[e]vidence obtained through wrongful search and seizure by state officers who are cooperating with federal officials must be excluded." 7 The Court's sensitivity to law enforcement's strategic behaviors remained a constant in later years. In 1949, the Court held that a search would be deemed federal in character, and hence subject to the exclusionary rule, if federal agents "participated in" or "had a hand in" the search yielding evidence. 8 Soon thereafter, in a pair of seminal Warren Court opinions, concern over law enforcement evasion reached its zenith. In Elkins v. United States, the Court outlawed what had come to be known as the "silver platter" doctrine, 9 which allowed evidence that state and local police had unconstitutionally seized to be handed over for use in federal criminal trials, when the police acted independently of federal agents. 10 In its next term, in Mapp v. Ohio, 11 the Court held that the federal exclusionary rule applied to state criminal trials as well, based on the recognition that officers, "being human," will submit to the "inducement to evasion" and seek to avoid legal limits. 12 Applying the exclusionary rule to state and federal agents alike, Justice Clark wrote on behalf of the sixmember Mapp majority, upheld faith in the forthrightness of law enforcement: "Denying shortcuts to only one of two cooperating law enforcement agencies tends naturally to breed legitimate suspicion of 'working arrangements' whose results are equally tainted." 13 Over the years it has been commonplace to suggest that in the early 1960s the Court did away with the "silver platter" doctrine. 14 In reality, however, the silver platter doctrine remains alive and well-albeit in a reincarnated variety of distinct forms. This is because the Warren Court intervened only with regard to the federal Fourth Amendment and its exclusionary rule, allowing silver platter doctrine to remain operative in a variety of other contexts. 15 Today, despite a sustained chorus of critical commentary, 16 state and federal courts typically permit silver platter handoffs and the legal evasion it facilitates. 17 Lacking in this commentary, however, is attention to what the New Jersey Supreme Court has aptly called the "vital, significant condition" 18 of silver platter doctrine: that evidence was secured independently by law enforcement of a sovereign other than that of the forum court. If rights and undermine sovereign search and seizure limits. Of course, as the Elkins Court observed, from the perspective of a criminal defendant, "it matters not" who employs the government agents engaged in unlawful behavior. 19 As the discussion here makes clear, however, such line-drawing continues to have major importance today, serving-as it did in the first several decades of the twentieth century-as a vital bulwark against strategic governmental efforts to evade legal constraints. 20 This Essay offers the first examination of modern intergovernmental "working arrangements" and the failure of courts to regulate the evasion of legal norms that it enables. 21 Part I examines caselaw dating from the 1920s and the "jolly little Prohibition game" 22 through the early 1960s on the issue, a time marked by considerable judicial scrutiny and concern. Part II surveys the varied and notably more indulgent approaches taken by state and lower federal courts since then, touching on such matters as wiretaps and search warrant requirements. Part III examines the many negative consequences of the judiciary becoming, as the Elkins Court put it, "accomplices" in wrongdoing. 23 Part IV proposes a new, more robust mechanism to address the challenge of intergovernmental illegality, which has assumed ever-greater significance as law enforcement agencies of different governments increasingly join forces to combat crime and domestic terrorism. 24 21ST CENTURY 79 (2000) , available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/ pdffiles1/bja/178936.pdf ("Multijurisdictional task forces (MJTFs) have become vital elements in the national effort to reduce the availability and use of illegal drugs and to reduce levels of violent crime. Because most law enforcement authority is limited to specific jurisdictions, but criminal activity is not, it is possible for large criminal enterprises to commit crimes beyond the scope of power of a particular law enforcement agency. Dealing with this problem requires cooperation among numerous law enforcement agencies."); NAT'L INST. OF decision had major implications for state-federal law enforcement relations. Weeks had been prosecuted in federal court for transmitting lottery tickets through the mail, based on information provided by local police who had illegally seized papers from his home and a subsequent illegal search by a federal marshal accompanied by local police. 31 In a unanimous opinion, the Court reversed Weeks's conviction, characterizing the search as one undertaken by federal agents and violative of the Fourth Amendment, warranting application of the federal exclusionary rule. 32 The full effect of Weeks would not be felt until 1919 and the onset of Prohibition, 33 when Congress ratified the Eighteenth Amendment 34 and enacted the National Prohibition Act. 35 For the first time in the nation's history, state and federal agents enjoyed concurrent authority, 36 resulting in a radical increase in enforcement activity nationwide. 37 Because its agents were few in number, the federal government looked to state and local law officers to arrest alleged bootleggers and to gather and collect evidence for use in federal Prohibition cases. 38 Unmistakably as well, reliance on non- (1.) After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
(2.) The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 40 For some time, evasive efforts by federal agents and state and local police were quite unabashed and overt. In one reported opinion, the court noted that federal authorities started a "little school" to instruct their counterparts on how best to secure evidence in support of federal cases, based on a "procedure [that] was systematic and frictionless." 41 Federal prosecutor and eventual U.S. presidential candidate Thomas Dewey was frank in his acknowledgement of intergovernmental evasion, relating that "[i]n dozens of cases in my own experience as a Federal prosecutor we had to rely on the evidence procured by the unhampered police of the State of New York, or important criminals would have gone free." 42 The end result of such strategic behavior, one commentator lamented, was to render the Fourth Amendment "wholly inocuous [sic] ." 43 The situation eventually stirred the Taft Court-itself generally favorably predisposed to Prohibition 44 -to intervene with a pair of decisions in 1927 that cast a critical eye on the prevailing modus operandi. 45 In the first and most important decision, Byars v. United States, local police secured a search warrant for Byars's home, which failed to satisfy federal Fourth Amendment standards, and invited a federal prohibition agent to effectively as it does without the full co-operation of state and local agencies; and its officials believe that it would require a field personnel ten times as great as the present Secret Service force if it were to operate without the assistance rendered by local agencies").
Id
39. See R.J.S., Comment, Prohibition Searches by New York State Police, 37 YALE L.J. 784, 785 (1928) (noting that because of the "advantage[s] of basing a case . . . upon a search beyond the condemning reach of the federal rule," federal prosecutors routinely used "evidence secured by local police. Indeed, it has been said that, because of the rigidly narrow grounds upon which a federal search will be deemed reasonable, the activity of the state officers is indispensable"); id.
(" [I] t is now the admitted policy, of the federal authorities to rely wherever possible upon the activity of the local peace officers for the arrest and prosecution of the typical bootlegger and inland rumrunner.").
40. accompany them to the residence. 46 The agent and local police found counterfeit revenue stamps used to imitate those on whiskey bottled in bond, resulting in the defendant's conviction in federal court. 47 By a unanimous vote, the Court held that the search "in substance and effect was a joint operation of the local and federal officers," triggering application of the federal exclusionary rule. 48 The Court acknowledged that the federal government could "avail itself of evidence improperly seized by state officers operating entirely upon their own account," but added that "the rule is otherwise when the federal government itself, through its agents acting as such, participates in the wrongful search and seizure." 49 The Court concluded, in similarly unequivocal terms:
To hold the contrary would be to disregard the plain spirit and purpose of the constitutional prohibitions intended to secure the people against unauthorized official action. The Fourth Amendment was adopted in view of long misuse of power in the matter of searches and seizures . . . ; and the assurance against any revival of it . . . is not to be impaired by judicial sanction of equivocal methods, which, regarded superficially, may seem to escape the challenge of illegality but which, in reality, strike at the substance of the constitutional right. 50 Later that same year, in Gambino v. United States, the Court, again by a unanimous vote, applied the federal exclusionary rule when, unlike in Byars, federal agents were not physically present during an illegal search. 51 In Gambino, New York state troopers unlawfully searched defendant's car, seized liquor, and provided the contraband to federal prosecutors. Because at the time New York had suspended enforcement of its state anti-liquor law, 52 the "cooperating" troopers seized the evidence "solely on behalf of the United States." 53 According to the Court, the federal prosecution "was, as conducted, in effect a ratification of the arrest, search and seizure made by the troopers on behalf of the United States." 54 56 In Lustig, local police alerted a federal Secret Service agent of alleged currency counterfeiting taking place at a hotel. 57 After peering through the keyhole of Lustig's room and questioning a chambermaid, the agent called local police to inform them that while he saw no evidence of counterfeiting, he "was confident that 'something was going on.'" 58 Local police thereafter obtained a search warrant, itself invalid under the Fourth Amendment, and searched the room while the federal agent remained off premises. 59 Upon discovering counterfeiting materials, police notified the agent who returned to the hotel to examine the evidence. The agent departed the scene with some of the materials, and the balance was later turned over to him. 60 In a five-member plurality opinion, rendered the same day as Wolf v. Colorado (also authored by Justice Frankfurter), 61 the Lustig Court held that the federal agent's involvement sufficed to trigger application of the exclusionary rule. 62 The plurality noted that it was not dispositive that the agent neither requested nor instigated the search. 63 Rather, a search is "a functional, not merely a physical, process": 62. Lustig, 338 U.S. at 79-80 (plurality opinion). The four dissenters, in an opinion by Justice Reed, agreed that Byars controlled but believed that its standard was misapplied. Id. at 81-83 (Reed, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the federal agent had merely "looked at the evidence secured by the state police before it was removed from the room" and "did not 'share in the critical examination of the uncovered articles as the physical search proceeded.'" Id. (quoting plurality opinion).
63. Id. at 78 (plurality opinion).
It surely can make no difference whether a state officer turns up the evidence and hands it over to a federal agent for his critical inspection with the view to its use in a federal prosecution, or the federal agent himself takes the articles out of a bag. It would trivialize law to base legal significance on such a differentiation. . . . To differentiate between participation from the beginning of an illegal search and joining it before it had run its course, would be to draw too fine a line in the application of the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted in Byars v. United States . . . . 64 After noting that "[t]he crux of [the Byars] doctrine is that a search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it," 65 the plurality emphasized that:
The decisive factor . . . is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means. In the case at bar it appears that the evidence upon which the search warrant was issued was furnished to the United States commissioner by an officer of the state, who subsequently participated actively in the search, with the sheriff of the county standing by, ready to render assistance if required. This participation by the state officers at least rendered the enterprise a joint undertaking of the state and federal officers, and, following the analogy of the holding in Byars v. United States . . . we think the trial judge should have required the state to justify the search by the production of the . . . warrant.
Id.
The Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in Little v. State, 159 So. 103 (Miss. 1935) illustrates a different take on state court treatment of federal agents during the Prohibition Era. In suppressing evidence of a liquor "still" seized by federal agents-acting alone-in violation of the state constitution, the Little court distanced itself from Byars. Writing that "[f]or the sake of uniformity of decision between the Supreme Court and the courts of this state, we would resolve any doubt in favor of the holding of that court," the court concluded that "decidedly the better and sounder reasoning is that federal officers making an illegal search" should be subject to state court oversight. Id. at 104. After noting that "[m]any acts in common are denounced as mid-point for its contemporaneous endorsement of the Weeks tenet that the Fourth Amendment regulated only federal searches, not those undertaken by state or local police. 68 Indeed, Lustig is best known today for the statement following the plurality's enunciation of its "hand in it" standard: "a search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter." 69 In Lustig, the Court's finding of federal participation avoided application of what came to be known as the "silver platter" doctrine, which allowed federal courts to admit evidence acquired by state or local officers, acting alone, in contravention of federal constitutional law. 70 The silver platter doctrine became the target of major criticism in subsequent years, 71 as federal prosecutors successfully cast searches as state in character, thereby avoiding application of the exclusionary rule. 72 In 1960, the Court at last addressed the doctrine in Elkins v. United States. 73 Adverting to the "practical difficulties" the Weeks carve-out presented for non-federal actors "in an era of expanding federal criminal jurisdiction," 74 the five-member Elkins majority held that evidence unconstitutionally crimes both by the Congress and the Legislatures of the states," the court stressed that practical concern over nullification of rights obliged it to adjudge federal agent conduct:
If the fruits of an illegal search under federal authority can be used in the state courts, and vice versa, the constitutional guaranty would be to a large extent nullified. Federal authority within its sphere operates in all the states, while state authority is bound down by state lines. In a large sense federal officers are state officers as well; they have the right to act in the states, while state officers cannot go beyond the state lines.
68 Looking back, the exclusionary rule seems a bit jerry-built-like a roller coaster track constructed while the roller coaster sped along. Each new piece of track was attached hastily and imperfectly to the one before it, just in time to prevent the roller coaster from crashing, but without the opportunity to measure the curves and dips preceding it or to contemplate the twists and turns that inevitably lay ahead. for evasion. 89 As a consequence, as one court later observed, the silver platter doctrine has "changed from its pristine form, exemplified by Byars and Lustig," necessitating continued judicial oversight as law enforcement seeks "to sanitize evidence." 90 As discussed next, this vacuum has been filled with a tangle of often conflicting and less exacting standards, as state and lower federal courts have struggled in their efforts to address the various modern-day silver platter permutations.
II. MODERN APPROACHES
It is fair to say that the effort to regulate evasion, like the search and seizure doctrine it principally implicates, "has not . . . run smooth." 91 Even during the heyday of Supreme Court efforts, from Prohibition through the early 1960s, federal courts evinced a range of views on how to assess evasion. For instance, courts at times generously interpreted Gambino to condemn police practices when state and federal law alike (not the latter alone) was allegedly violated, 92 and when there existed "an established practice" 93 or a general understanding that a case would "go federal." 94 It had for years been the general understanding and practice between the local police and the federal prohibition officers that when the police squad made seizures of liquor or arrests they would submit the cases to the prohibition department, which had the first option of prosecuting such of them as it desired. . . . It was not the general practice for both the police squad and the federal officers actually to participate in the making of the same raid or seizure; but the raid would be made in the light of the above understanding . . . WARREN COURT 19 (1992) . Harlan, in a case in which the defense challenged a warrantless speakeasy raid by city officers, sought to avoid suppression by testifying that cooperation had not been "nearly so good" as it had been under a predecessor local chief of police. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
While prevailing in the suppression hearing, Harlan managed to incense the then-serving New York City Police Commissioner, requiring Harlan to later issue a press release explaining that:
When I talked about cooperation in my testimony, I used that word in the sense of a centralized and coordinated activity between the United States Attorney's Office and the police in the enforcement of prohibition, a meaning which the counsel for the defense relied upon as establishing their proposition [that] the police in enforcing national prohibition were in all cases acting as Federal agents. By way of illustration I pointed out that since the abolition of the special service division by [the new police commissioner], in which were at one time centered all the prohibition enforcement activities of the New York City Police Department, the contact between the police and the United States Attorney's office had become less centralized and more diffuse.
Id. at 19-20 (first alteration in original). Harlan went on to stress that the U.S. Attorney's office "at all times had the fullest measure of cooperation from [the new commissioner] and all his subordinates." Id. at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. See, e.g., Narcotics Hearing, supra note 72, at 1190, 1197 (statement of Warren Olney III, Assistant Att'y Gen.) (noting that "frequently Federal and local officers work in close cooperation, and the cases, when completed, are presented in the State or Federal Court, depending" inter alia on "the manner in which the evidence was acquired").
98. Kamisar, supra note 21, at 1171; see also id. at 1175 ("It is fairly clear that in most circuits a general understanding or practice no longer serves as a substitute for proof of federal participation in the particular state search.").
99 
A. FEDERAL COURTS-SEARCH WARRANTS
Today, in contrast to the formative years of modern criminal procedure, state law often imposes more exacting requirements on law enforcement than federal law. A significant exception lies, however, with the securing and execution of search warrants, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. 103 Because the rule contains requirements that can be more specific and stringent than counterpart state rules (e.g., limiting nighttime searches), the context affords a ready parallel to pre-Elkins silver platter cases with the federal government doing its best to characterize events as state-dominated, evading application of federal requirements and possible exclusion of evidence. 104 Courts over time have exhibited markedly different degrees of scrutiny, 105 with only a handful of decisions (usually of earlier vintage, citing to Byars and Lustig) deeming such searches federal in character. 106 Courts 101. See id. ("[C]ases kept arising in which the federal courts were faced with determining whether there had been such participation by federal officers in a lawless state search as to make inadmissible in evidence that which had been seized. And it is fair to say that in their approach to this recurring question, no less than in their disposition of concrete cases, the federal courts did not find themselves in complete harmony . . . ."); see also United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124, 126 (7th Cir. 1956) (stating that "courts have not been in complete agreement as to just how closely federal officers have to be connected").
It warrants mention that the negative sentiment was not shared by Justice Frankfurter (joined by Justices Clark, Harlan, and Whitaker), who in dissent in Elkins and its companion case Rios v. United States averred that he was "not aware of evidence to sustain the view that the distinction between federal and state searches has been particularly difficult of application. Individual cases have merely presented the everyday issue of evaluating testimony and testimony touching an issue relatively easy of ascertainment." Elkins, 364 U.S. at 242 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 233 (noting that Justice Frankfurter's opinion also applies to Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) typically require "significant federal involvement" 107 or proof of an explicit "working arrangement" designed to evade federal procedural rights. 108 Representative of the more relaxed view, one federal trial court averred the following:
[T]he essential part of the spawning ground for abuse of cooperation between state and federal investigative agencies has disappeared. . . . The climate for full cooperation in connection with searches is now complete and the courts should not continue to look askance each time such cooperation takes place. . . . . . . . . . . The court . . . believes that to become bogged down in the morass of attempting to classify a search as a federal search or a state search is not helpful, and that the thrust of the inquiry should be directed to whether either federal or state officer violated the Constitution in the course of the search. 109 Courts also regularly discount the effect of state and local officers being federally deputized to serve in joint task forces, 110 and, in stark contrast to earlier judicial sensitivity to "general understandings," 111 downplay the existence of long-term, institutionalized working arrangements. 112 Moreover, in contrast to the functionalist approach of Lustig, some courts atomistically focus only on the pre-warrant acquisition stage, 113 others on the execution of the warrant, 114 and others still on the securing of evidence. 115 And one court, the Fourth Circuit, disregards federal involvement in the investigative Cir. 1980 phase altogether, focusing instead solely on whether a state warrant was secured at the express "direction or urging" of a federal agent. 116
B. STATE COURTS
State courts, with at least equal frequency, have been asked to address defendant claims of improper working arrangements. Such claims typically concern the applicability of state constitutional and wiretapping provisions, which can vary both among states and between state and federal governments.
State Constitutional Law
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v. Mollica is the seminal case vis-à-vis application of forum constitutional law. 117 In Mollica, FBI agents, without a search warrant, obtained room telephone records of a patron of an Atlantic City, New Jersey hotel allegedly involved in illegal bookmaking. 118 The records confirmed the FBI's suspicions and they provided the records to the New Jersey State Police, who secured state search warrants leading to the filing of state gambling charges against Mollica and a co-defendant. 119 The Mollica court first concluded that the initial warrantless search and seizure of the phone records violated the defendants' right to privacy under the New Jersey Constitution, 120 and then turned to whether the violation could be forgiven under the silver platter doctrine, because it was effectuated by federal government agents operating under a less exacting constitutional regime. 121 Application of the doctrine, the court emphasized, was "subject to a vital, significant condition": that the action of federal agents "not be alloyed by any state action or responsibility." 122 s] hotel-room telephone were obtained by federal agents exercising federal authority in a manner that was in conformity with federal standards and consistent with federal procedures."). The court endorsed the silver platter principle that federal officers are not subject to higher state constitutional norms and thus can "turn over to state law enforcement officers incriminating evidence, the seizure of which would have violated state constitutional standards." Id.
122. Id. at 1328-29.
question, the court explained, is "whether in any legally significant degree the federal action can or should be considered state action." 123 The "key element" in the analysis, the court stated, citing Lustig and Gambino, is the existence of "intergovernmental agency"-"the agency [relationship] vel non between the officers of the respective jurisdictions." 124 Because state standards can only govern state agents and those acting on their behalf 125 the question was "whether for constitutional purposes the federal agents can be said to be acting under the 'color of state law. '" 126 According to the Mollica court:
[A]ntecedent mutual planning, joint operations, cooperative investigations, or mutual assistance between federal and state officers may sufficiently establish agency and serve to bring the conduct of the federal agents under the color of state law. On the other hand, mere contact, awareness of ongoing investigations, or the exchange of information may not transmute the relationship into one of agency. 127 After noting that the inquiry "will always pose a fact-sensitive exploration that is influenced greatly by the surrounding circumstances," and finding the record insufficient to draw a conclusion, the court remanded the matter for further factual development and analysis. 128 The Mollica court's "intergovernmental agency" standard has proved enormously influential. 129 Pena v. State, a Texas Court of Appeals decision, provides a noteworthy example. 130 Officials discovered Pena at the U.S.-Mexico border carrying drugs; he was detected during a vehicle inspection arising out of "Operation Gate," undertaken by U.S. Customs and the Texas Department of Public Safety ("DPS"). 131 DPS agents were looking for stolen vehicles, while Customs agents were after weapons, ammunition, or currency in excess of $10,000 being taken across the border. 132 Customs Agent Rivera initially stopped the vehicle Pena was in, and upon learning that Pena had been previously convicted of auto 123 135 On appeal, the central question was whether the non-consensual, warrantless seizure of Pena was permissible based on the broad authority enjoyed by federal Customs agents in their policing of border areas. 136 Noting that the "critical element" is whether "'agency vel non'" existed between DPS and Customs, 137 the Pena court found no agency relationship to exist. Even though DPS Sergeant Garcia's questioning of Pena and Pena's consequent attempt to conceal were the "catalyst" of the drug seizure, this "did not convert Rivera into an agent for the State of Texas." 138 One final case, recently decided by the Connecticut Supreme Court, arising in the state-state rather than the state-federal context, will suffice to highlight state variability and the generous standard courts use today. In State v. Boyd, the court addressed whether evidence secured by a search in New York, linking Boyd to a murder carried out in Connecticut, was admissible in a Connecticut murder prosecution. 139 The search in question occurred after New York police, investigating Boyd for illegal drug activity, learned that Norwalk, Connecticut police were looking into his involvement in the murder. 140 A New York officer invited two Connecticut police detectives to attend the search of defendant's Mamaroneck, New York apartment. 141 The Connecticut detectives were in the apartment, and while they did not physically participate in the search, they hoped to discover evidence of the Connecticut murder in plain view. 142 After evidence of drug activity but no murder-related evidence was discovered in the search, the Connecticut detectives left the apartment in the company of their New York colleagues, who had learned that other Upon their arrival at the arrest scene, one of the Connecticut detectives and a New York officer noticed a cell phone located on the front passenger seat of Boyd's car. 144 While the record did not indicate who seized the phone or when it was seized, 145 New York police, while in the company of the Connecticut detectives, thereafter read to the detectives numbers stored on the cell phone, which were used to implicate Boyd in the Connecticut murder. 146 The Boyd court thus had to address which state's law should apply: Connecticut's, which would bar the cell phone evidence because it was unconstitutionally secured under state law, or New York's, which would adopt the contrary position. 147 Citing and discussing Byars, Gambino, and Lustig, and noting their continued relevance, 148 the Connecticut Supreme Court offered that it need not decide "what level of participation" by its state law enforcement agents was required to trigger the more demanding state standard. 149 Nevertheless, the court proceeded to assess and downplay the role of Connecticut police, 150 and it ignored the critical question of their role in the seizure of the defendant's cell phone. 151 The Court then cursorily added-without having developed agency analysis in its opinion-that "under any standard, the Mamaroneck police were not acting as agents for the Norwalk police. 154 In Coleman, a joint task force consisting of federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives agents and Illinois law enforcement embarked on a drug investigation implicating the defendant. 155 State and federal officers arranged for an informant to use a recording device during telephone conversations with the defendant, which the state police had taped. 156 The recordings complied with federal law but were contrary to state law prohibiting audio recordings in the absence of a warrant or consent by all parties involved. 157 After noting that a recording secured by federal agents alone would not be problematic, 158 the Coleman court addressed whether the state-federal undertaking enjoyed similar immunity. The court concluded that suppression would be proper only if there existed evidence of a "secret agreement [or] secret cooperation for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose." 159 Thus, rather than having admissibility turn on the extent of Illinois agents' participation, what was important was evidence of subjective intent on the part of state and federal actors, support for which was absent from the record. 160 Massachusetts, however, does not look to the existence of a "secret agreement," but requires quite substantial state involvement. 161 In Commonwealth v. Brown, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed whether a taping that was illegal under Massachusetts law, yet not federal law, warranted suppression. 162 Officials believed Brown, a physician, was illegally prescribing medication. Brown was targeted by a joint task force that included local police deputized as "special DEA agents." 163 One local officer, however, was not deputized, and "[t]hrough [him], the task force convinced one of the defendant's patients to participate in a 'sting' operation," which federal authorities taped. 164 Faced with these facts, the Brown court concluded that the more demanding Massachusetts law did not control because " [t] 166 Before proceeding, it is worthwhile to reflect upon what is at stake when governments work to evade legal restrictions and courts fail to intercede.
First and perhaps foremost, judicial failure to regulate evasion sends a troubling signal that what the Elkins Court called "subterfuge and evasion" 167 is permissible. Courts, with their failure, add to the already large array of judicially sanctioned forms of police "gamesmanship," 168 including use of trickery and deceit in securing confessions, 169 stopping and arresting individuals on the basis of pretext, 170 indulging in the "dirty business" of using informers and false friends, 171 allowing criminal misconduct by informants, 172 and engaging in "hand-offs" whereby police illegally secure information and provide it to compatriots who then conduct an "independent" search. 173 As the growing literature on procedural justice attests, 174 and as Justice Brandeis's "teacher" concept foretold, 175 when the public perceives law enforcement agents as acting improperly, there can come a corresponding diminution in the public's sense of governmental legitimacy and their willingness to be law-abiding. 176 When courts fail to critically assess working arrangements, they signal, in the public forum of suppression hearings, with their educative and expressive function, 177 that evasion is acceptable. 178. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) ("A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence."); cf. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 218 (1956) (stating, in exercise of its supervisory authority to forbid state court testimony by a federal agent who violated Rule 41 in acquiring evidence, that the rules are "designed to protect the privacy of the citizen . . . . That policy is defeated if the federal agent can flout them and use the fruits of his unlawful act either in federal or state proceedings").
The institutional failure is thus doubly problematic: not only do citizens feel that police are evading a legal limit; they also come away with the impression that the deprivation results from a broader collusive effort of government (writ large). 179 And here again findings from the procedural justice literature lend cause for concern. Research has shown that perceptions of legitimacy are often independent of outcome, 180 and in this regard it is important to recognize that a finding of government agent involvement need not result in exclusion of evidence. 181 A second major concern relates to the rule of law. As Professor Jerome Skolnick has written, law enforcement agents "in a democracy are not merely bureaucrats. They are also . . . legal officials, that is, people belonging to an institution charged with strengthening the rule of law in society." 182 When agents evade limits imposed on their search and seizure authority, they flout this core expectation, 183 and the preconditions on which such authority is predicated. 184 The upshot of this regulatory vacuum can be that no limit-other than one based on the federal constitutionoperates to constrain law enforcement, 185 that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances . . . .").
184. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 138-39 (1997) (defining rule of law as "a system of objective and accessible commands, law which can be seen to flow from collective agreement rather than from the exercise of discretion or preference by those persons who happen to be in positions of authority").
185. This can be so even when the law regulating non-forum agents parallels that regulating forum agents. Laxity also has significant practical impact for federalism on the ground. When forum courts fail to subject their law enforcement agents to forum law, they deny citizens the protection afforded by the legal rule in question. 191 Perhaps less obvious, but no less important, a crucial federalismenforcing limit is displaced, one that operates on the charging discretion of prosecutors. Historically, prosecutorial discretion on whether to "go" federal or state has gone unconstrained by constitutional limit, 192 and it is widely acknowledged that forum shopping occurs based on significant comparative advantages, which can afford major plea-negotiation leverage. 193 When courts fail to regulate the evasionary tactics of front-line law enforcement agents, prosecutors are allowed to exercise their enormous filing discretion without fear that evidence might be excluded, 194 a key factor in prosecutorial decision making. 195 Fourth and finally, judicial laxity allows for creation of an outsized law enforcement apparatus, freed from legal controls designed to limit the power and reach of its constituent parts. Since its origin in the mid-1800s, American policing has been notable for its consciously disaggregated 194. Typically, the threat of exclusion emanates from violation of a substantively distinct legal norm, examples of which have been surveyed in the text. It is not unusual, however, for two jurisdictions to be subject to an ostensibly identical provision, but one that is subject to varied interpretation. For instance, while state courts must follow U.S. Supreme Court mandates on federal constitutional matters, they need not follow federal circuit court caselaw and can resolve open interpretive questions as they see fit. See, e.g., State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ohio 2001) (noting that lower federal court decisions enjoy only "some persuasive weight" in state court determinations of federal constitutional law matters). When prosecutorial discretion is exercised in favor of federal court, a double evasion can in effect occur: a more generous state position on a federal constitutional provision is avoided, along with one based on state constitutional law. Evasion can also occur when a case is filed in state court and a more rightsprotective position has been adopted by a federal circuit court.
195. Importantly, moreover, it is often the case that forum choice is not always counterbalanced by another government's desire to retain jurisdiction over a criminal matter. As Professor Rachel Barkow has observed, "[l]ocal prosecutors are typically quite happy to have federal prosecutors take on local cases so that defendants receive longer sentences, and they often willingly use the prospect of federal prosecution to gain leverage in their own plea negotiations with defendants. Local police officers also often prefer the federal option for the same reasons." Rachel E. quality, 196 in theory permitting a greater degree of democratic accountability 197 and lessening the threat of concentrated excessive power. 198 In recent decades, however, law enforcement has become increasingly aggregated, driven in significant part by the practical advantages of intergovernmental cooperation, 199 affording resource and expertise benefits, 200 and significant data collection and storage advantages. 201 Indisputably as well, money has fueled aggregation, as federal "equitable sharing" policy regarding asset forfeiture has resulted in a dramatic increase in joint operations. 202 Laxity, in tandem with these developments, undercuts the prospect that law enforcement of "different governments," as Madison would have it, will "controul [sic] each other." 203 They are permitted to seamlessly act as a unified force, in the process evading otherwise applicable legal controls.
IV. A PROPOSED RESPONSE
Although the approaches surveyed in Part II take shape in varied legal contexts, ranging from wiretaps to constitutional law, they each fall short in policing improper working arrangements and avoiding their negative consequences. The state of affairs is highlighted by the common tendency to require existence of an agency relationship between law enforcement actors of different governments, "agency vel non" as the New Jersey Supreme Court put it in State v. Mollica. 204 Such a standard, while perhaps appropriate in the context of evidence secured by private parties, 205 private police, 206 and foreign agents 207 is inapt in the context of actors who enjoy formal governmental authority. Moreover, if anything, agency speaks only to the Gambino branch of analysis, 208 not the "participation" concern of Byars and Lustig, 209 and ignores the existence of more subtle "understandings" among repeat-player domestic law enforcement agencies, acknowledged by the Gambino Court itself. 210 saying that the norm-setting authority of domestic sovereigns is deserving of respect and recognition.
Equally inapt is the approach requiring explicit proof of subjective intent to evade, what the Illinois Supreme Court termed a "secret agreement." 217 As with Fourth Amendment doctrine more generally, 218 the main difficulty of such a standard concerns the typical absence of overt manifestation of governmental intent. 219 It cannot be expected that agents will readily acknowledge evasive intent or design, and while such acknowledgement should not be discounted as an evidentiary matter, it should not be required.
Rather, consistent with Byars and Lustig, courts should focus on government participation and the functional existence of a working arrangement. In support of a threshold allegation, a defendant-movant might be able to point to existence of an intergovernmental "Memorandum of Understanding," 220 being targeted by a joint task force, 221 or the deputization of agents. 222 Because such arrangements often are not committed to writing, 223 however, courts should also be amenable to considering informal intergovernmental practices, 224 as in the Prohibition Era. 225 At the same time, Gambino-like situations, when the evidence in question is of interest only to forum agents, although rare as a practical matter, 226 should also trigger concern.
It will often be the case, however, that details will not be readily available to a defendant-movant. While forum law enforcement agents might at times freely acknowledge participation, or witnesses might provide helpful information, critically important factual matters often will remain obscured.
Such obscurity is made all the more likely as a result of at least two modern realities. The first is that advances in technology have radically enhanced opportunities for less visible involvement, 227 certainly relative to the era of Byars and Lustig, when it was typically manifested by officers' physical presence. 228 The second concerns federal asset forfeiture law, which as noted earlier figures centrally in contemporary law enforcement operations. 229 Federal "equitable sharing" policy in particular gives state and local agents strong incentive to play up their role in an operation, as their share of proceeds is directly tied to their "degree of direct participation." 230 Meanwhile, federal agents have a natural institutional incentive to downplay their participation to ensure admission of evidence.
As a result, much like in the context of similar areas involving collusion in the absence of direct proof, such as price-fixing, 231 the proof regime should allow for consideration of circumstantial evidence. 232 If a defendant-[Vol. 99:293 movant makes a showing by a preponderance of evidence of a working arrangement, 233 the burden should shift to the prosecution to rebut the claim, 234 based on particular evidence, not mere denials. 235 If the government is unsuccessful, the reviewing court should apply the more demanding rule or standard that the prosecuting government seeks to avoid.
When assessing the evidentiary record, courts should exhibit the kind of sensitivity evidenced in Byars and its progeny, seasoned by an awareness of the far more technologically sophisticated means by which working arrangements can occur today. 236 In the late 1950s, Professor Yale Kamisar published interview findings highlighting the reluctance of state and federal agents to judicially "reconstruct a 'silver platter' raid." 237 No reason exists to think the incentive structure is any different today, and courts must remain cognizant of this reality.
Ultimately, it must be acknowledged, the success of any institutional fix very much depends on the broader context in which oversight will occur. Suffice it to say, judicial rulings seen as "pro-defendant" can prove publicly unpopular. 238 Even so, it bears emphasis that an affirmative judicial finding Amendment. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 n.12 (1985) (noting that "direct proof" of government intent to circumvent the counsel right "will seldom be available to the accused" and prescribing proof standard that government "'must have known' that its agent was likely to obtain incriminating statements from the accused"). Here, the "likely to obtain" standard could apply based on an inquiry along the lines of: "Were the circumstances such that a reasonable agent would have realized at the outset of the operation that it was likely to yield evidence serving as a basis for prosecution in a court within this jurisdiction?" 233. Cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (holding that a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if, based on a preliminary showing, preponderance of evidence exists that a search warrant affidavit contains a knowingly and intentionally false statement by officer); Gonzalez v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965, 992 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the government's discovery obligation in response to an allegation that an individual acted as a government agent in the Sixth Amendment Messiah context).
234. Such a burden shifting approach is used in any number of similar situations, including "Kastigar" hearings when the government must establish that evidence it seeks to use is independent of any immunized statements provided by a defendant. in this context differs from that in a typical suppression hearing. Not only will it often be the case that another government can prosecute a defendant, 239 but the policy goal served should be seen as beyond reproach: forum government agents should not be permitted to evade and neutralize limits on their investigative authority. 240 The foregoing obviously envisions a continued role for courts as the chief bulwark against intergovernmental investigative illegality. Reason for this lies not so much in the judiciary's superior institutional competency in principle. Rather, it is because, compared to the alternatives, courts offer the most realistic promise of addressing the problem.
Guidelines, self-imposed by law enforcement, might be one option. As courts have signaled on occasion, a best practices-oriented agency could adopt a policy specifying ab initio that any intergovernmental investigative effort adhere to the more demanding legal norm of one of the governments. 241 Adoption of such a policy, in addition to providing clarifying guidance to agents, might have appeal because it would allow agencies to avoid judicial scrutiny of their practices. 242 The likelihood of such a policy being adopted, however, is significantly undercut by the strong antipathy law enforcement agencies are known to have for guidelines that limit or condition their investigative prerogative. 243 Alternatively, prosecutorial rule-making might hold promise. The federal "Petite Policy," employed in the Double Jeopardy-successive prosecutions context, 244 represents perhaps the best-known example of prosecutorial self-regulation. However, prosecutors no less than police bridle against guidelines, 245 has been consistently questioned. 246 Moreover, it is one thing for prosecutors to self-regulate in the comparatively rare instance of successive prosecution. 247 It is quite another to expect them to embrace a rule that removes a fundamental litigation advantage and regulates their ongoing relationship with law enforcement agents (including those of other governments).
Finally, little prospect exists for a legislative solution. As a formal matter, legislative effort to regulate and condition investigations could raise separation-of-powers concerns, amounting to meddling with what Professor Dan Richman has referred to as the "explicit or tacit negotiation among enforcement agencies." 248 Of greater practical importance are the political realities militating against legislative action. Even though regulation would be susceptible of positive public portrayal, as noted earlier, 249 the public choice literature underscores why any legislated limit on law enforcement wherewithal is unlikely to come to pass. 250 Furthermore, as Professor William Stuntz famously observed, legislators are natural allies of prosecutors, 251 and they are generally disinclined to take the lead on initiatives that limit prosecutorial authority.
CONCLUSION
As a consequence of the "metaphysics" of the nation's decentralized governmental structure, 252 it has long been accepted that lines of responsibility must be drawn when assessing the legality of law enforcement investigative practices. While the imperative receded in visibility in 1960 with Elkins and the demise of the Fourth Amendment's "silver platter" doctrine, it remains the case today that agents of one sovereign, when acting independently of those of another, can hand over evidence on a silver platter obtained in contravention of non-federal constitutional law. While modern-day silver platter doctrine has been the subject of considerable scholarly attention, 253 this Essay has shifted focus and addressed the sole caveat attaching to the doctrine's application: government agents who do not act alone but rather work with agents of another sovereign, resulting in neutralization of otherwise applicable legal restrictions.
In the past, with the U.S. Supreme Court in the lead, courts were prone to critically examine intergovernmental investigative efforts, on vigilant guard against "circuitous and indirect methods" by law enforcement. 254 As late as 1968, the Fifth Circuit averred that it did not want to discourage cooperation among law enforcement but warned that "such cooperation should comply with the rules." 255 Judicial vigilance, however, has long since waned, a problematic development assuming heightened importance amid the ever-expanding growth and sophistication of intergovernmental investigative activity. This Essay has highlighted the need for increased judicial oversight and sought to pick up where mid-twentieth century courts left off, providing a reinvigorated framework to combat "working arrangements" and the evasion of legal norms that they permit.
